The situation in Sudan and South Sudan - Security Council, 10272nd meeting.


 Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan.



This afternoon (13 November), the Security Council is expected to vote on a draft resolution renewing the mandate of the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) for another year, until 15 November 2027. (Abyei is a disputed area along the Sudan-South Sudan border.) The draft text in blue also extends until 15 November 2027 the mission’s support for the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM), established in 2011 to conduct monitoring and verification activities along the Sudan-South Sudan border.

The US, the penholder on Abyei, authored the draft text in blue. The negotiations on the draft resolution apparently focused on UNISFA’s future configuration, progress against benchmarks established by the Council, and the future of UNISFA’s support for the JBVMM.

Background

The Council established UNISFA through resolution 1990 of 27 June 2011 following the outbreak of violence in Abyei and the withdrawal of Sudanese and South Sudanese forces under an agreement reached between the parties. The mission was mandated to monitor the redeployment of forces, facilitate humanitarian assistance, and support the implementation of the 20 June 2011 Agreement on Temporary Arrangements for the Administration and Security of the Abyei Area. However, the parties have since made limited progress towards resolving Abyei’s final status, establishing the Abyei Police Service, or putting in place permanent administrative arrangements.

In resolution 2802 of 14 November 2025, which most recently renewed UNISFA’s mandate, the Council established five benchmarks intended to guide progress towards conditions for UNISFA’s eventual transition or exit. These covered the withdrawal of unauthorised forces, resumption of meetings of the Joint Political and Security Mechanism (JPSM), establishment of the Abyei Police Service and temporary administrative and security arrangements, issuance of visas for UNISFA police personnel, and appointment of a civilian Deputy Head of Mission. The resolution also linked future decisions on the mission’s configuration to progress against these benchmarks.

The security situation in Abyei has been affected by the conflict in Sudan. This has included the presence of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a Sudanese paramilitary force, in the area and its reported interference in local community structures, including through the establishment of checkpoints, and in joint institutions such as the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee. In December 2025, drone strikes on UNISFA’s logistics base in Kadugli killed six peacekeepers and injured nine others. The Sudanese government has attributed responsibility for the attack to the RSF, an accusation that the latter has denied. The RSF also reportedly detained peacekeepers, abducted civilian personnel, and seized UNISFA assets in February 2025.

On 19 October, drone attacks near Amiet market and the Todach area killed at least 150 people and injured dozens of others, prompting UNISFA to undertake emergency response and engagement with local stakeholders. On 23 October, Council members issued a press statement condemning the attacks and calling for a prompt, full, and transparent investigation. During the Council’s latest meeting on UNISFA, held on 5 November, Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix said the drone strikes added a “new and concerning dimension” to security in the area.

Negotiations on the Draft Resolution

The US engaged with the other permanent members (P5) before circulating a zero draft to all members on 29 October and convening in-person negotiations the next day (30 October). On 5 November, the penholder circulated a revised draft and put it under silence until Monday (9 November), which 11 Council members broke: namely the three African members (A3)—the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Liberia, and Somalia—as well as China, Denmark, France, Greece, Latvia, Pakistan, the UK, and Russia. On Tuesday (10 November), the US circulated a second revised draft and placed it under silence procedure until the following day (11 November), which five Council members broke (the A3, China, and Russia). Yesterday (12 November), the US circulated a third revised draft and put it in blue ahead of the vote.

The zero draft sought to strengthen the benchmark framework established by resolution 2802, adding negotiations on Abyei’s final status as a sixth area of expected progress. This provision was maintained in the draft resolution in blue. The zero draft also proposed more specific timelines for the parties to advance these issues and linked the future renewal of UNISFA’s mandate to their implementation.

The zero draft also called for four dedicated negotiating sessions on final status before the mission’s mandate expired, with the parties documenting outcomes and agreeing on implementation deadlines. Following feedback from Council members, the first revised draft softened some of these requirements, replacing the specified negotiating sessions and deadlines with calls for regular, results-oriented discussions and “substantive progress” towards a mutually agreed resolution.

A central point of contention during the negotiations was the proposed link between the mission’s future and progress against the benchmarks. The A3 members, China, and Russia argued against making the mission’s continuation conditional on the parties’ political progress, citing the security situation, UNISFA’s role in protecting civilians, and the challenges facing both countries. The disagreement over this was evident when 11 Council members broke silence on the first revised draft. Consequently, in the second revised draft, the penholder retained the requirement for “demonstrable progress” against the benchmarks, but qualified the Council’s consideration of any future reconfiguration by also taking into account conditions on the ground, civilian protection needs, and the security implications of a potential withdrawal. Following the silence break on the second revised draft, the draft resolution in blue also specifies that the Council’s consideration should take into account consultations with Sudan and South Sudan. These provisions partially address concerns that UNISFA could be penalised for the parties’ failure to meet commitments beyond the mission’s control, while preserving a mechanism for the Council to maintain pressure on the parties.

The Council’s European members apparently succeeded in strengthening some thematic provisions, including references to international law and the women, peace and security (WPS) agenda. These members also called for more realistic implementation timelines and facilitated the inclusion of language addressing the threats posed to UNISFA personnel by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The proposals reflect these members’ position that the resolution should retain adequate attention to protection and accountability for attacks against peacekeepers alongside its emphasis on political benchmarks and mission performance.

Accordingly, the draft text in blue places greater emphasis on UNISFA’s protection responsibilities, including deployments to high-risk areas, early warning, community engagement and women’s participation in local peacebuilding structures. It also strengthens the mission’s role in supporting rule-of-law arrangements at Amiet market. It further strengthens provisions addressing attacks against peacekeepers, including demands for an investigation into the December 2025 drone strikes on the Kadugli logistics base and the return of assets seized by the RSF.

The draft resolution in blue also changes the reporting cycle, partly accommodating China’s request to reduce the frequency of reporting. It requests two written reports, due by 15 May and 15 October 2027. The May report is to be submitted in writing only, while the October report is to be presented at a Council briefing ahead of the mission’s next mandate renewal. Unlike the previous revised draft, which envisaged a separate assessment by 31 August 2027, the final version incorporates into the October report an assessment of demonstrable progress against the benchmarks, as well as the security implications of any potential withdrawal or reconfiguration of the mission.

The draft resolution in blue contains more explicit language on the RSF’s presence and activities in Abyei. While resolution 2802 referred generally to unauthorised armed actors, the draft text in blue specifically demands the RSF’s withdrawal and calls for an end to its interference in community structures and joint institutions. It states that the RSF has no authority to appoint representatives to, or otherwise interfere with, institutions established under the 2011 Agreement, following reports that it appointed a representative as co-chair of the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee.

The draft text in blue also contains new language concerning the benchmark on the withdrawal of unauthorised forces from Abyei. This provision calls for the withdrawal of the RSF and for the withdrawal of the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF) from southern Abyei. It also calls on the Sudanese authorities to ensure that the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) refrain from military operations in Abyei. A separate provision requests the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa and the African Union (AU) to coordinate with UNISFA and other relevant stakeholders towards the RSF’s withdrawal, including by addressing its efforts to assert political influence through the co-optation of Misseriya community structures.

During the negotiations, Russia sought to take account of the positions of both governments and questioned the language on the presence of the SSPDF. In this context, it cited South Sudan’s explanation at the 5 November briefing that its forces should not be “construed as an unauthorized military presence” because they are present in areas that are “distinguished from the Abyei area in the UNISFA mandate”. The draft resolution in blue nonetheless retains the reference to the SSPDF.

Russia, supported by China, also called for reference to “the Government of Sudan” rather than the more general formulation “Sudanese authorities”. The term “the Government of Sudan” was included in the zero draft but was removed in the first revised draft, apparently at France’s request. China, supported by Russia, also sought to replace references to the “Transitional government of South Sudan” with “the Government” or “Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity”. Neither of these requests was accommodated, however.

The future of UNISFA’s support for the JBVMM also featured in the negotiations. The draft resolution in blue retains the proposed reconfigured hybrid satellite/aerial/mobile monitoring model for the JBVMM, but makes future UN support dependent on the parties’ agreement to the new arrangements and sustained cooperation. It also links border demarcation discussions to the outcome of a second JPSM meeting, with expectations concerning withdrawal from the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone (SDBZ), reopening border-crossing corridors, and deployment of national monitors.

Other provisions address UNISFA’s operational configuration. The draft resolution in blue retains the authorised troop ceiling of 3,250 and police ceiling of 640, while expressing the Council’s intention to reduce the police ceiling as the Abyei Police Service becomes operational. It specifies that the first Formed Police Unit (FPU) is to be deployed within six months and a civilian Deputy Head of Mission within three months of the adoption of the resolution, with the remaining two FPUs and individual police officers to be deployed within one year.

The draft resolution in blue appears to narrow some differences over the specificity of the benchmarks and the operational arrangements for UNISFA, but the central disagreement over conditionality remains. The Council is broadly united behind maintaining the mission, yet members differ over how far its continuation should depend on political progress by the parties. The final text retains the link between UNISFA’s future and demonstrable progress by the parties, while providing for flexibility in assessing the mission’s future configuration in light of conditions on the ground, civilian protection needs, and security considerations.

Watch the situation in Sudan and South Sudan - Security Council, 10272nd meeting


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